every subject, but even think that it is of no consequence what opinions
they hold. Whether a particular action is morally right or wrong, or
whether a book or a picture is really good or bad, is a matter upon which
they form either no judgment or a wrong one with perfect equanimity. The
secret of this state of mind is, I think, that it is on the whole too
much bother to form a correct judgment; and it is so much easier to let
things slide, and to take the good the gods provide you, than to
carefully hold the scales until the balance is steady. But can anybody
doubt that this abdication of the seat of judgment by large numbers of
people is most hurtful to mankind? Does anyone believe that there would
be so many bad books, bad pictures, and bad buildings in the world if
people were more justly critical? Bad things continue to be produced in
profusion, and worse things are born of them, because a vast number of
people do not know that the things are bad, and do not care, even if they
do know. What sells the endless trash published every day? Not the
_few_ purchasers who buy what is vile because they like it, but the
_many_ purchasers who do not know that the things are bad, and when they
are told so, think there is not much harm in it after all. In short,
they think that judging rightly is of no consequence and only a bore.

But I think I shall carry you all with me when I say that this society,
almost by its very _raison d'etre_, desires to form just and proper
judgments; and that one of the principal objects which we have in view in
meeting together from time to time is to learn what should be thought,
and what ought to be known; and by comparing our own judgments of things
with those of our neighbours, to arrive at a just modification of our
rough and imperfect ideas.

Although criticism is the act of judging in general, and although I shall
not strictly limit my subject to any particular branch of criticism, yet