The spring and summer had been anxious times enough in
Quebec. But the autumn was a great deal worse. Bad news
kept coming down from Montreal. The disaffected got more
and more restless and began 'to act as though no opposition
might be shown the rebel forces.' And in October it did
seem as if nothing could be done to stop the invaders.
There were only a few hundred militiamen that could be
depended on. The regulars, under Colonel Maclean, had
gone up to help Carleton on the Montreal frontier. The
fortifications were in no state to stand a siege. But
Cramahe was full of steadfast energy. He had mustered
the French-Canadian militia on September 11, the very
day Arnold was leaving Cambridge in Massachusetts for
his daring march against Quebec. These men had answered
the call far better in the city of Quebec than anywhere
else. There was also a larger proportion of English-speaking
loyalists here than in Montreal. But no transports brought
troops up the St Lawrence from Boston or the mother
country, and no vessel brought Carleton down. The loyalists
were, however, encouraged by the presence of two small
men-of-war, one of which, the _Hunter_, had been the
guide-ship for Wolfe's boat the night before the Battle
of the Plains. Some minor reinforcements also kept
arriving: veterans from the border settlements and a
hundred and fifty men from Newfoundland. On the 3rd of
November, the day St Johns surrendered to Montgomery, an
intercepted dispatch had warned Cramahe of Arnold's
approach and led him to seize all the boats on the south
shore opposite Quebec. This was by no means his first