do the admissions contained in papers already made public.

It is the practically universal opinion, not only in America, but in
other neutral countries as well, that the repeated excuses and shifty
evasions by which Berlin rejected every plan for mediation, arbitration,
or any other programme which would tend toward a peaceful solution of
the crisis, combined with Berlin's acknowledgment that "a free hand was
assured" to Austria, and the further fact that all correspondence
between Berlin and Vienna is carefully suppressed, are amply sufficient
to convince any fair-minded, unprejudiced man that the Berlin Government
is primarily responsible for the war. The fact that Germany has for
years published a voluminous war literature, has taught her people to
think and live in terms of war, and was fully prepared with enormous
reserves of materials when war came; whereas the Allied countries were
notoriously unprepared and in no condition to ward off the first blows
of a surprise attack, to say nothing of fighting an offensive campaign,
is generally considered enough to create a strong presumption that
Germany and not the Allies wanted war. The official correspondence of
the _ante-bellum_ days is full of suggestions for arbitration,
mediation, and other plans to preserve the peace, coming from the Allied
countries. Americans have searched in vain for a single plan for a
peaceful solution coming from Germany. On the contrary, your own version
of the negotiations shows only a persistent rejection by Berlin of every
peace plan, and a dogged determination to support Vienna in her assault
on Servia--an assault which, following the robbery of Bosnia and
Herzegovina by Austria under Germany's protection, could not be endured
by a civilised world, and was, therefore, certain to cause war.

When Servia, urged by the Allies to yield as much as possible in order
to prevent war, acceded to eight out of ten of Austria's humiliating