years and years this war has been by the German Government most
deliberately and systematically prepared for. The fact remains that
Britain--though for a long period she had foreseen danger and had on the
naval side slowly braced herself to meet it--was on the military side
caught at the last moment unprepared; that France was so little
intending war that a large portion of the nation was actually still
protesting against an increase in the size of the standing army; and
that Russia--whatever plans she may have had, or not had, in mind--was
confessedly at the same period two years or so behind in the
organization and completion of her military establishment.

Whether right or wrong, it can hardly be denied that the moment of the
precipitation of war was chosen and insisted on by Germany. After
Austria's monstrous and insulting dictation to Servia (23rd July), and
Servia's incredibly humble apology (25th), Austria was still not
allowed to accept the latter, and the conference proposed (26th July) by
Sir E. Grey--though accepted by France, Russia, and Italy--was refused
by Germany (27th). On the 28th Austria declared war on Servia. It was
perfectly clear to every one that Russia--after what had happened before
in 1908-9, with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina--could not possibly
allow this insult to Servia to pass. Germany, therefore, by this move
forced Russia's hand; and at a moment when Russia was known or supposed
to be comparatively unprepared.[11] France had been involved in some
military scandals and was still debating as to the two years' instead of
three years' period for her normal military service. The German
Ambassador at Vienna had openly said that France was not in a condition
for facing a war. England was currently supposed in Germany to be
seriously hampered by domestic troubles at home--chiefly of course
among the Irish, but also amongst the Suffragettes(!) _and_ by
widespread disaffection in India. It was thought, therefore, that