the advance of General Maude in Mesopotamia dispelled it, and made it
easier not only to release a portion of our white garrison in India
for active service elsewhere, but to recruit a large force of Indians
for the Empire's work in other climes. Bagdad was a tremendous blow to
German ambitions. The loss of it spelt ruin to those hopes of Eastern
conquest which had prompted the German intrigues in Turkey, and it was
certain that the Kaiser, so long as he believed in ultimate victory,
would refuse to accept the loss of Bagdad as final. Russia's
withdrawal as a belligerent released a large body of Turkish troops
in the Caucasus, and set free many Germans, particularly 'technical
troops' of which the Turks stood in need, for other fronts. It was
then that the German High Command conceived a scheme for retaking
Bagdad, and the redoubtable von Falkenhayn was sent to Constantinople
charged with the preparations for the undertaking. Certain it is that
it would have been put into execution but for the situation created by
the presence of a large British Army in the Sinai Peninsula. A large
force was collected about Aleppo for a march down the Euphrates
valley, and the winter of 1917-18 would have witnessed a stern
struggle for supremacy in Mesopotamia if the War Cabinet had not
decided to force the Turks to accept battle where they least wanted
it.

The views of the British War Cabinet on the war in the East, at any
rate, were sound and solid. They concentrated on one big campaign,
and, profiting from past mistakes which led to a wastage of strength,
allowed all the weight they could spare to be thrown into the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force under a General who had proved his high military
capacity in France, and in whom all ranks had complete confidence, and
they permitted the Mesopotamian and Salonika Armies to contain the
enemies on their fronts while the Army in Palestine set out to crush