CHAPTER VI

PREPARING FOR 'ZERO DAY'


About the middle of August it was the intention that the attack on the
Turks' front line in Southern Palestine should be launched some time
in September. General Allenby knew his force would not be then at
full strength, but what was happening at other points in the Turkish
theatres of operations might make it necessary to strike an early blow
at Gaza to spoil enemy plans elsewhere. However, it was soon seen that
a September advance was not absolutely necessary. General Allenby
decided that instead of making an early attack it would be far more
profitable to wait until his Army had been improved by a longer period
of training, and until he had got his artillery, particularly some of
his heavy batteries, into a high state of efficiency. He would risk
having to take Jerusalem after bad weather had set in rather than be
unable, owing to the condition of his troops, to exploit an initial
success to the fullest extent. How wholly justified was this decision
the subsequent fighting proved, and it is doubtful if there was ever a
more complete illustration of the wisdom of those directing war policy
at home submitting to the cool, balanced calculations of the man on
the spot. The extra six weeks spent in training and preparation were
of incalculable service to the Allies. I have heard it said that
a September victory in Palestine would have had its reflex on the
Italian front, and that the Caporetto disaster would not have assumed
the gigantic proportions which necessitated the withdrawal to Italy
of British and French divisions from the Western Front and prevented
Cambrai being a big victory. That is very doubtful. On the contrary, a
September battle in Palestine before we were fully ready to follow