of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality
or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another;
therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example,
of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the
same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the
nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being. (2) Thus, the more
existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly
and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object.
(55:3) Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more
is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed,
through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper
object. (4) This is worthy of remark.

[56] (1) We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly
called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not
as we imagine it. (2) For instance, I know that the earth is round,
but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere,
and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or,
that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. (56:3) However,
examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent
with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have
made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we
can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the
same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it. (4) We can,
I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility.
(56:5) Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c.,
I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I
might have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person
to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake.
(6) This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any