be true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound
themselves, and pervert the order of nature. (5) However, if we
proceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from primary
elements - that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back
as we can reach, - we need not fear any deceptions of this kind.

[76] (1) As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned,
there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions. (2) For
when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal
notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the
mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really
existing in nature. (3) Again, there are many things in nature, the
difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to
the understanding; so that it may readily happen that such things are
confounded together, if they be conceived abstractedly. (4) But since
the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be
conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in
the understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to
mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of
it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth.
(5) This is, in fact, a being single and infinite [76z] ; in other
words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being
found. [76a]

[77] (1) Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now
to investigate the doubtful idea - that is, to inquire what can
cause us to doubt, and how doubt may be removed. (2) I speak of
real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see
exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does
not really hesitate. (77:3) The cure of the latter does not fall