equal to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed.
(79:4) In the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a
triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some
arch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowledge
of God under the like condition, and when we have attained to it,
it is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every doubt which we can
possess concerning clear and distinct ideas.

[80] (1) Thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due
order, inquiring first into those things which should first be
inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association,
and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to
answer them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very
certain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a
suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation
which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in
ignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in
hand must needs be imperfect. (2) We may, therefore, conclude that
doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation.

[81] (1) These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part
of my treatise on method. (2) However, in order not to omit anything
which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its
faculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and
forgetfulness.
(81:3) The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is
strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding.
(4) For the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it
remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we
forget it. (5) For instance, a number of unconnected words is much