section of it, had been led to believe that it could ever have been
otherwise. Austria had committed an unpardonable act of provocation,
which at first reasonable opinion in Germany openly condemned.
Simultaneously the German Government set in motion an avalanche of
racial feeling to play off against the just and moderate measures taken
by other powers to checkmate Austrian aggression. In addition to the
racial hostility, which had been lashed into bitterness during the
spring of 1914, came Germany's morbid conception of national and
personal honour. Lastly the fear of a Russian invasion was astutely
inoculated into the nation.

It is the author's firm conviction, and the military events in Poland
and Galicia have only strengthened this opinion, that from the very
beginning Germany could have prevented any Russian invasion of her
territory, but she did not desire that end, but rather that the fear of
Russia should complete the "Kriegsrausch" of the German nation. After
frightening the people the Berlin Government struck its blow in the
direction of their political ambitions--to the West, and after the
Russians had been allowed to penetrate German territories they were
hurled over the Eastern frontiers at the end of August. While the Kaiser
was sending peaceful telegrams to Petrograd and Vienna, the Press was
full of horrible pictures of Cossack barbarism and the dread terrors of
the Russian knout, both of which--the public was led to believe--were
about to strike Germany.

In this manner the Kaiser and his advisers created a national psychology
which left open only two alternatives: the absolute humiliation of
Russia and the consequent hegemony of Germany in Europe--or war.