friends, our own security, and the future of European peace. In view of
this one must be able to act."[11]

[Footnote 11: _Deutsche Zeitung_, July 31st.]

The internal tactics of the German Government had been successful all
along the line. Insignificant Serbia had dropped out of the reckoning.
Russia must be humbled. The German nation, believing itself entirely
peaceful, and convinced that its leaders had done everything possible
for peace, now demanded in no unmistakable voice--action! mobilization!
war!

Announcements of mobilization on all sides (Switzerland, Holland,
Belgium) doubtless added to the popular belief that Germany desired
above all things--peace. Still, in spite of the warlike spirit of the
nation and the burning desire to settle off Russia once and for all,
there was an undercurrent of overstrained nervousness. A Dresden paper
of July 30th relates that between the hours of two and four on the
preceding afternoon a Berlin newspaper had been asked thirty-seven
different questions on the telephone relating to rumours of
assassinations, mobilization, etc.

The process of inspiring national confidence, however, had by no means
suffered through neglect. France was represented as being unprepared
and, together with England, desiring only peace. As early as July 27th
in the _Tägliche Rundschau_ the public had been told that Italy, had
officially declared herself ready and willing to stand by the Central
Powers as an ally.

Even Japan was used to stiffen Teutonic courage. The _Deutscher Kurier_