Dianoetia. This word is derived from [Greek: dianoia], or that power of
the soul which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its
reasoning from intellect. Plato is so uncommonly accurate in his diction,
that this word is very seldom used by him in any other than its primary
sense.

The Divine, [Greek: to Theion], is being subsisting in conjunction with
the one. For all things, except the one, viz. essence, life, and
intellect, are considered by Plato as suspended from and secondary to the
gods. For the gods do not subsist in, but prior to, these, which they
also produce and connect, but are not characterized by these. In many
places, however, Plato calls the participants of the gods by the names of
the gods. For not only the Athenian Guest in the Laws, but also Socrates
in the Phaedrus, calls a divine soul a god. "For," says he, "all the
horses and charioteers of the gods are good," &c. And afterwards, still
more clearly, he adds, "And this is the life of the gods." And not only
this, but he also denominates those nature gods that are always united to
the gods, and which, in conjunction with them, give completion to one
series. He also frequently calls daemons gods, though, according to
essence, they are secondary to and subsist about the gods. For in the
Phaedrus, Timaeus, and other dialogues, he extends the appellation of
gods as far as the daemons. And what is still more paradoxical than all
this, he does not refuse to call some men gods; as, for instance, the
Elean Guest in the Sophista. From all this, therefore, we must infer that
with respect to the word god, one thing which is thus denominated is
simply deity; another is so according to union; a third, according to
participation; a fourth, according to contact; and a fifth, according to
similitude. Thus every superessential nature is primarily a god; but
every intellectual nature is so according to union. And again, every
divine soul is a god according to participation; but divine daemons are