That God and man he may distinctly see.

Let us also, imploring the assistance of the same illuminating power, begin
the solitary journey.

Of all the dogmas of Plato, that concerning the first principle of things
as far transcends in sublimity the doctrine of other philosophers of a
different sect, on this subject, as this supreme cause of all transcends
other causes. For, according to Plato, the highest God, whom in the
Republic he calls the good, and in the Parmenides the one, is not only
above soul and intellect, but is even superior to being itself. Hence,
since every thing which can in any respect be known, or of which any
thing can be asserted, must be connected with the universality of things,
but the first cause is above all things, it is very properly said by
Plato to be perfectly ineffable. The first hypothesis therefore of his,
Parmenides, in which all things are denied of this immense principle,
concludes as follows: "The one therefore is in no respect. So it seems.
Hence it is not in such a manner as to be one, for thus it would be
being, and participate of essence; but as it appears, the one neither is
one, nor is, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It
appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of that,
which is not? How can it? Neither therefore does any name belong to it,
nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not
appear that there can. Hence it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor
conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it
seems." And here it must be observed that this conclusion respecting the
highest principle of things, that he is perfectly ineffable and
inconceivable, is the result of a most scientific series of negations, in
which not only all sensible and intellectual beings are denied of him,
but even natures the most transcendently allied to him, his first and