force and efficacy from these.

In the next place, they seem not to be sufficiently aware, that universal
is better than partial demonstration. For that demonstration is the more
excellent which is derived from the better cause; but a universal is more
extended and excellent than a partial cause; since the arduous
investigation of the why in any subject is only stopped by the arrival at
universals. Thus if we desire to know why the outward angles of a
triangle are equal to four right angles, and it is answered, Because the
triangle is isosceles; we again ask, but why Because isosceles? And if it
be replied, Because it is a triangle; we may again inquire, But why
because a triangle? To which we finally answer, because a triangle is a
right-lined figure. And here our inquiry rests at that universal idea,
which embraces every preceding particular one, and is contained in no
other more general and comprehensive than itself. Add too, that the
demonstration of particulars is almost the demonstration of infinites; of
universals the demonstration of finites; and of infinites there can be no
science. That demonstration likewise is the best which furnishes the mind
with the most ample knowledge; and this is, alone, the province of
universals. We may also add, that he who knows universals knows
particulars likewise in capacity; but we can not infer that he who has
the best knowledge of particulars, knows any thing of universals. And
lastly, that which is universal is the object of intellect and reason;
but particulars are coordinated to the perceptions of sense.

But here perhaps the experimentalist will say, admitting all this to be
true, yet we no otherwise obtain a perception of these universals than by
an induction of particulars, and abstraction from sensibles. To this, I
answer that the universal which is the proper object of science, is not
by any means the offspring of abstraction; and induction is no otherwise