animated body, or of the soul corporalized, though in such perception the
psychical idiom predominates over the corporeal; just as in bodies, the
corporeal idiom has dominion according to interval and subsistence. As
the irrational soul, therefore, has its being in something different from
itself, so far it is indigent of the subordinate: but a thing of this
kind will not be the principle.

Prior them to this essence, we see a certain form separate from a
subject, and converted to itself, such as is the rational nature. Our
soul, therefore, presides over its proper energies and corrects itself.
This, however, would not be the case, unless it was converted to itself;
and it would not be converted, to itself unless it had a separate
essence. It is not therefore indigent of the subordinate. Shall we then
say that it is the most perfect principle? But, it does not at once exert
all its energies, but is always indigent of the greater part. The
principle, however, wishes to have nothing indigent: but the rational
nature is an essence in want of its own energies. Some one, however, may
say that it is an eternal essence, and has never-failing essential
energies, always concurring with its essence, according to the self-moved
and ever vital, and that it is therefore unindigent; but the principle is
perfectly unindigent. Soul therefore, and which exerts mutable energies,
will not be the most proper principle. Hence it is necessary that there
should be something prior to this, which is in every respect immutable,
according to nature, life, and knowledge, and according to all powers and
enemies, such as we assert an eternal and immutable essence to be, and
such as is much honoured intellect, to which Aristotle having ascended,
thought he had discovered the first principle. For what can be wanting to
that which perfectly comprehends in itself its own plenitudes (oleromata),
and of which neither addition nor ablation changes any thing belonging to
it? Or is not this also, one and many, whole and parts, containing in