either fundamental, or final: those of the fundamental kind are philosophy,
human nature, the soul of man; of the final kind are love, beauty, good.
The differential regard knowledge, as it stands related to practice; in
which are considered two questions: one of which is, whether virtue is to
he taught; the other is, whether error in the will depends on error in
the judgment. The subjects of the speculative dialogues relate either to
words, or to things. Of the former sort are etymology, sophistry, rhetoric,
poetry; of the latter sort are science, true being, the principles of
mind, outward nature. The practical subjects relate either to private
conduct, and the government of the mind over the whole man; or to his
duty towards others in his several relations; or to the government of a
civil state, and the public conduct of a whole people. Under these three
heads rank in order the particular subjects practical; virtue in general,
sanctity, temperance, fortitude, justice, friendship, patriotism, piety;
the ruling mind in a civil government, the frame and order of a state,
law in general, and lastly, those rules of government and of public
conduct, the civil laws.

Thus, for the sake of giving the reader a scientific, that is a
comprehensive, and at the same time a distinct view of Plato's writings,
we have attempted to exhibit to him, their just and natural distinctions;
whether he chooses to consider them with regard to their inward form or
essence, their outward form or appearance, their matter; or their end:
that is, in those more familiar terms, we have used in this Synopsis,
their genius, their character, their subject, and their design.

And here it is requisite to observe, that as it is the characteristic of
the highest good to be universally beneficial, though some things are
benefitted by it more and others less, in consequence of their greater or
less aptitude to receive it; in like manner the dialogues of Plato are