in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how.
Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, being answerable to the
numberless rovings of fancy and windings of language. It is in
short, a manner of speaking out of the simple and plain way (such as
reason teacheth and proveth things by), which by a pretty surprising
uncouthness in conceit or expression doth affect and amuse the
fancy, stirring in it some wonder, and breeding some delight
thereto. It raiseth admiration, as signifying a nimble sagacity of
apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit,
and reach of wit more than vulgar: it seeming to argue a rare
quickness of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits
applicable; a notable skill, that he can dexterously accommodate
them to the purpose before him; together with a lively briskness of
humour, not apt to damp those sportful flashes of imagination.
(Whence in Aristotle such persons are termed [Greek], dexterous men;
and [Greek], men of facile or versatile manners, who can easily turn
themselves to all things, or turn all things to themselves.) It also
procureth delight, by gratifying curiosity with its rareness or
semblance of difficulty (as monsters, not for their beauty, but
their rarety; as juggling tricks, not for their use, but their
abstruseness, are beheld with pleasure) by diverting the mind from
its road of serious thoughts; by instilling gaiety and airiness of
spirit; by provoking to such dispositions of spirit in way of
emulation or complaisance; and by seasoning matters, otherwise
distasteful or insipid, with an unusual, and thence grateful tang.

But saying no more concerning what it is, and leaving it to your
imagination and experience to supply the defect of such explication,
I shall address myself to show, first, when and how such a manner of
speaking may be allowed; then, in what matters and ways it should be