from imputations of which kind as in its temper and frame it is
really most free (it never quenching natural light or cancelling the
dictates of sound reason, but confirming and improving them); so it
carefully declineth them, enjoining us that "if there be any things"
[Greek] ("lovely," or grateful to men), "any things" [Greek] ("of
good report" and repute), "if there be any virtue and any praise"
(anything in the common apprehensions of men held worthy and
laudable), we should "mind those things," that is, should yield them
a regard answerable to the esteem they carry among rational and
sober persons.

Whence it may seem requisite so to interpret and determine St.
Paul's meaning here concerning eutrapelia (that is, facetious
speech, or raillery, by our translators rendered "jesting"), that he
may consist with himself, and be reconciled to Aristotle, who
placeth this practice in the rank of virtues; or that religion and
reason may well accord in the case: supposing that, if there be any
kind of facetiousness innocent and reasonable, conformable to good
manners (regulated by common sense, and consistent with the tenor of
Christian duty, that is, not transgressing the bounds of piety,
charity, and sobriety), St. Paul did not intend to discountenance or
prohibit that kind.

For thus expounding and limiting his intent we have some warrant
from himself, some fair intimations in the words here. For first,
what sort of facetious speech he aimeth at, he doth imply by the
fellow he coupleth therewith; [Greek], saith he, [Greek] (foolish
talking, or facetiousness): such facetiousness therefore he
toucheth as doth include folly, in the matter or manner thereof.
Then he further determineth it, by adjoining a peculiar quality