Every man hath indeed a commission, in due place and season, with
discretion and moderation to admonish his neighbour offending; but
otherwise to speak ill of him, no private man hath just right or
authority, and therefore, in presuming to do it, he is disorderly
and irregular, trespassing beyond his bounds, usurping an undue
power to himself.

2. We should never speak ill of any man without apparent just
cause. It must be just; we must not reproach men for things
innocent or indifferent; for not concurring in disputable opinions
with us, for not complying with our humour, for not serving our
interest, for not doing anything to which they are not obliged, or
for using their liberty in any case: it must be at least some
considerable fault, which we can so much as tax. It must also be
clear and certain, notorious and palpable; for to speak ill upon
slender conjectures, or doubtful suspicions, is full of iniquity.
"[Greek], "They rail at things which they know not," is part of
those wicked men's character, whom St. Jude doth so severely
reprehend. If, indeed, these conditions being wanting, we presume
to reproach any man, we do therein no less than slander him; which
to do is unlawful in any case, is in truth a most diabolical and
detestable crime. To impose odious names and characters on any
person, which he deserveth not, or without ground of truth, is to
play the devil; and hell itself scarce will own a fouler practice.

3. We should not cast reproach upon any man without some necessary
reason. In charity (that charity which "covereth all sins," which
"covereth a multitude of sins") we are bound to connive at the
defects, and to conceal the faults of our brethren; to extenuate and
excuse them, when apparent, so far as we may in truth and equity.