Let us examine the three leading points about this peace business in
which this jaded statecraft is most apparent.

Let the reader ask himself the following questions:--

Does he know what the Allies mean to do with the problem of Central
Africa? It is the clear common sense of the African situation that while
these precious regions of raw material remain divided up between a
number of competitive European imperialisms, each resolutely set upon
the exploitation of its "possessions" to its own advantage and the
disadvantage of the others, there can be no permanent peace in the
world. There can be permanent peace in the world only when tropical and
sub-tropical Africa constitute a field free to the commercial enterprise
of every one irrespective of nationality, when this is no longer an area
of competition between nations. This is possible only under some supreme
international control. It requires no special knowledge nor wisdom to
see that. A schoolboy can see it. Any one but a statesman absolutely
flaccid with overstrain can see that. However difficult it may prove to
work out in detail, such an international control _must_ therefore be
worked out. The manifest solution of the problem of the German colonies
in Africa is neither to return them to her nor deprive her of them, but
to give her a share in the pooled general control of mid-Africa. In
that way she can be deprived of all power for political mischief in
Africa without humiliation or economic injury. In that way, too, we can
head off--and in no other way can we head off--the power for evil, the
power of developing quarrels inherent in "imperialisms" other than
German.

But has the reader any assurance that this sane solution of the African