On the other hand, I think it an unfounded conjecture that Prince Bülow was
deliberately building with a view to attacking the British Empire. I see
no reason to doubt his sincerity when he says that he looked forward to a
peaceful solution of the rivalry between Germany and ourselves, and that
France, in his view, not Great Britain, was the irreconcilable enemy.[4]
In building her navy, no doubt, Germany deliberately took the risk of
incurring a quarrel with England in the pursuit of a policy which she
regarded as essential to her development. It is quite another thing,
and would require much evidence to prove that she was working up to a
war with the object of destroying the British Empire.

What we have to bear in mind, in estimating the meaning of the German
naval policy, is a complex series of motives and conditions: the genuine
need of a navy, and a strong one, to protect trade in the event of war,
and to secure a voice in overseas policy; the genuine fear of an attack by
the Powers of the Entente, an attack to be provoked by British jealousy;
and also that indeterminate ambition of any great Power which may be
influencing the policy of statesmen even while they have not avowed it to
themselves, and which, expressed by men less responsible and less discreet,
becomes part of that "public opinion" of which policy takes account.

[Footnote 1: Published in 1908.]

[Footnote 2: See, e.g., Dawson, "Evolution of Modern Germany," p. 348.]

[Footnote 3: Some of these are cited in Bülow's "Imperial Germany," p. 36.]

[Footnote 4: See "Imperial Germany," pp. 48, 71, English translation.]