The facts show clearly that Germany was challenging as well as she could
the British supremacy at sea; that she was determined to become a naval
as well as a military Power; and that her policy was, on the face of it,
a menace to this country; just as the creation on our part of a great
conscript army would have been taken by Germany as a menace to her. The
British Government was bound to make counter-preparations. I, for my own
part, have never disputed it. I have never thought, and do not now think,
that while the European anarchy continues, a single Power can disarm in the
face of the others. All this is beyond dispute. What is disputable, and a
matter of speculative inference, is the further assumption that in pursuing
this policy Germany was making a bid to destroy the British Empire. The
facts can certainly be accounted for without that assumption. I myself
think the assumption highly improbable. So much I may say, but I cannot
say more. Possibly some day we may be able to check conjecture by facts.
Until then, argument must be inconclusive.

This question of the naval rivalry between Germany and Great Britain
is, however, part of the general question of militarism. And it may be
urged that while during the last fifteen years the British Government has
shown itself favourable to projects of arbitration and of limitation of
armaments, the German Government has consistently opposed them. There is
much truth in this; and it is a good illustration of what I hold to be
indisputable, that the militaristic view of international politics is
much more deeply rooted in Germany than in Great Britain. It is worth
while, however, to remind ourselves a little in detail what the facts
were since they are often misrepresented or exaggerated.

The question of international arbitration was brought forward at the first
Hague Conference in 1899.[2] From the beginning it was recognized on all
sides that it would be idle to propose general compulsory arbitration for