French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy,
but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such
a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in
all the parties concerned.

The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length,
with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in Diplomacy."
The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various
Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student
will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action
of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse,
and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and
straightforwardly.

The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful
impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war. Thus Baron
Beyens writes:--

The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another
war as a necessary evil.[4]

And again:--

The pacific settlement of the conflict of 1911 gave a violent impulse to
the war party in Germany, to the propaganda of the League of Defence and
the Navy League, and a greater force to their demands. To their dreams
of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge against France now
mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic success secured in an underground
struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that alone, in the eyes
of this rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan question by