at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that

at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of
the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar and
M. Poincaré, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the two
allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would not
dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure.

Baron Beyens continues:--

At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European war
prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but among
all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of armaments.
M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion, announced
on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the
Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German
army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the
part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war
on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4]

But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined
to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested,
there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears
almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the
situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military.
The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed,
as professional soldiers usually do, in the "inevitability" of war, and
they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude
may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince
Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: "The soldiers think about war. It is their business