As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian
troops, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the
Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that
nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of
diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration
of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that
button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of
control.[8]

On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized
against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had
mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover,
in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe
that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to
Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his
soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger. We do not
definitely know. What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that
precipitated the war.

We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the
German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:--

As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next day
[after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann
(I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser to
prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to persuade
his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last effort of
their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their
efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of
War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous