unite to oppose them.

This design of the French has been long formed, and long known, both in
America and Europe, and might, at first, have been easily repressed, had
force been used instead of expostulation. When the English attempted a
settlement upon the island of St. Lucia, the French, whether justly or
not, considering it as neutral, and forbidden to be occupied by either
nation, immediately landed upon it, and destroyed the houses, wasted the
plantations, and drove, or carried away, the inhabitants. This was done
in the time of peace, when mutual professions of friendship were daily
exchanged by the two courts, and was not considered as any violation of
treaties, nor was any more than a very soft remonstrance made on our
part.

The French, therefore, taught us how to act; but an Hanoverian quarrel
with the house of Austria, for some time, induced us to court, at any
expense, the alliance of a nation, whose very situation makes them our
enemies. We suffered them to destroy our settlements, and to advance
their own, which we had an equal right to attack. The time, however,
came, at last, when we ventured to quarrel with Spain, and then France
no longer suffered the appearance of peace to subsist between us, but
armed in defence of her ally.

The events of the war are well known: we pleased ourselves with a
victory at Dettingen, where we left our wounded men to the care of our
enemies, but our army was broken at Fontenoy and Val; and though, after
the disgrace which we suffered in the Mediterranean, we had some naval
success, and an accidental dearth made peace necessary for the French,
yet they prescribed the conditions, obliged us to give hostages, and
acted as conquerors, though as conquerors of moderation.