therefore, as those inconveniencies may be prevented by other means, I
cannot but declare that I am far from approving it.

Our ancestors, sir, have always thought it the great business of this
house to watch against the encroachments of the prerogative, and to
prevent an increase of the power of the minister; and the commons have
always been considered as more faithful to their trust, and more
properly the representatives of the people, in proportion as they have
considered this great end with more attention, and prosecuted it with
more invariable resolution. If we inquire into the different degrees of
reputation, which the several assemblies of commons have obtained, and
consider why some are remembered with reverence and gratitude, and
others never mentioned but with detestation and contempt, we shall
always find that their conduct, with regard to this single point, has
produced their renown or their infamy. Those are always, by the general
suffrage of mankind, applauded as the patterns of their country, who
have struggled with the influence of the crown, and those condemned as
traitors, who have either promoted it by unreasonable grants, or seen it
increase by slow degrees, without resistance.

It has not, indeed, sir, been always the practice of ministers to make
open demands of larger powers, and avow, without disguise, their designs
of extending their authority; such proposals would, in former times,
have produced no consequences but that of awakening the vigilance of the
senate, of raising suspicions against all their proceedings, and of
embarrassing the crown with petitions, addresses, and impeachments.

They were under a necessity, in those times, of promoting their schemes;
those schemes which scarcely any ministry has forborne to adopt, by more
secret and artful and silent methods, by methods of diverting the