is suspected, be agreeable to justice; and whether it be rational before
there is any proof of a crime, to point out the criminal.

We are to consider, my lords, whether it is not unjust to hear, against
any man, an evidence who is hired to accuse him, and hired with a reward
which he cannot receive without confessing himself a man unworthy of
belief. It is to be inquired, whether the evidence of a man who declares
only what he _believes_, ought to be admitted, when the nature of the
crimes allows stronger proof; and whether any man ought to be examined
where he cannot be punished if he be found perjured.

A natural and just regard to our own rights, on the preservation of
which the continuance of the constitution must depend, ought to, alarm
us at the appearance of any attempt to invade them; and the necessity of
known forms of justice, ought to incite us to the prevention of any
innovation in the methods of prosecuting offenders.

For my own part, my lords, I cannot approve either the principles or
form of the bill. I think it necessary to proceed by known precedents,
when there is no immediate danger that requires extraordinary measures,
of which I am far from being convinced that they are necessary on the
present occasion. I think that the certainty of a crime ought to precede
the prosecution of a criminal, and I see that there is, in the present
case, no crime attempted to be proved. The commons have, in my opinion,
already exceeded their privileges, and I would not willingly confirm
their new claims. For these reasons, my lords, I openly declare, that I
cannot agree to the bill's being read a second time.

Lord TALBOT spoke next, to this effect:--My lords, so high is my
veneration for this great assembly, that it is never without the utmost