its remotest consequences; I have assisted the arguments against the
bill by favourable suppositions, and imaginary circumstances, and have
endeavoured to divest my own opinion of some appendant and accidental
advantages, that I might view it in a state less likely to attract
regard; and yet I cannot find any reason by which I could justify myself
to my country or my conscience, if I should concur in rejecting this
bill, or should not endeavour to promote it. I am not unacquainted, my
lords, with the difficulties that obstruct the knowledge of our own
hearts, and cannot deny that inclination may be sometimes mistaken for
conviction; and men even wise and honest, may imagine themselves to
believe what, in reality, they only wish: but this, my lords, can only
happen for want of attention, or on sudden emergencies, when it is
necessary to determine with little consideration, while the passions
have not yet time to subside, and reason is yet struggling with the
emotions of desire.

In other circumstances, my lords, I am convinced that no man imposes on
himself without conniving at the fraud, without consciousness that he
admits an opinion which he has not well examined, and without consulting
indolence rather than reason; and, therefore, my lords, I can with
confidence affirm, that I now declare my real opinion, and that if I
err, I err only for want of abilities to discover the truth; and hope it
will appear to your lordships, that I have been misled at least by
specious arguments, and deceived by fallacious appearances, which it is
no reproach not to have been able to detect.

It will, my lords, be granted, I suppose, without hesitation, that the
law is consistent with itself; that it never at the same time commands
and prohibits the same action; that it cannot be at once violated and
observed. From thence it will inevitably follow, that where the