by the diminution of their commerce, and the alienation of their allies.

For this reason, sir, it has been necessary frequently to engage in
private treaties, to obviate designs sometimes justly, and at other
times, perhaps, unreasonably suspected. It has been proper to act upon
remote suppositions, and to conclude alliances which were only to be
publickly owned, in consequence of measures taken by some other powers,
which measures were sometimes laid aside, and the treaty, therefore, was
without effect. In some of these provisionary contracts, it is easy to
conceive, that designs were formed not to the advantage of some powers,
whom yet we do not treat as enemies, which were only to be made publick
by the execution of them: in others, perhaps, some concessions were made
to us, in consideration of the assistance that we promised, by which the
weakness of our allies may be discovered, and which we cannot disclose
without making their enemies more insolent, and increasing that danger
from which they apply to us for security and protection.

If to this representation of the nature of the papers, with which our
offices have been filled by the negotiations of the last twenty years,
any thing were necessary to be added, it may be farther alleged, that it
has long been the practice of every nation on this side of the globe, to
procure private intelligence of the designs and expectations of the
neighbouring powers, to penetrate into the councils of princes and the
closets of ministers, to discover the instructions of ambassadours, and
the orders of generals, to learn the intention of fleets before they are
equipped, and of armies before they are levied, and to provide not only
against immediate and visible hostilities, but to obviate remote and
probable dangers.

It need not be declared in this assembly, that this cannot always be