For, let us suppose, my lords, a man whose conduct exposes him to
punishment, and who knows that he shall not long be able to conceal it;
what can be more apparently his interest, than to contrive such an
accusation as may complicate his own wickedness with some transactions
of the person to whom this bill relates? He may, indeed, be possibly
confuted, and lose the benefit offered by the state; but the loss of it
will not place him in a condition more dangerous than that which he was
in before; he has already deserved all the severity to which perjury
will expose him, and by forging a bold and well-connected calumny, he
has at least a chance of escaping.

Let us suppose, my lords, that the bill now under our consideration,
assigned a pecuniary reward to any man who should appear against this
person, with a clause by which he that should accuse him falsely should
be dismissed without his pay; would not this appear a method of
prosecution contrary to law, and reason, and justice? Would not every
man immediately discover, that the witnesses were bribed, and therefore
they would deserve no credit? And what is the difference between the
advantage now offered and any other consideration, except that scarcely
any other reward can be offered so great, and consequently so likely to
influence?

It is to be remembered, that the patrons of this bill evidently call for
testimony from the abandoned and the profligate, from men whom they
suppose necessarily to confess their own crimes in their depositions;
and surely wretches like these ought not to be solicited to perjury by
the offer of a reward.

How cruel must all impartial spectators of the publick transactions