war, or to withdraw her commerce from the ocean. The popular voice
demanded the former course. Though France was, in the abstract, as
unjust as England, her oppressive measures did not affect American
commerce, and hence the indignation of the people was directed chiefly
against Great Britain; but with the president it was different. Though
his sympathies were with. France, his judgment was against her as well
as England. In his maturer wisdom, he could now appreciate the great
good sense of Washington's neutrality. Besides, the grand old man Thomas
Jefferson was determined to preserve peace, for it was his favorite
maxim that "the best war is more fatal than the worst peace." A further
reason led him to refuse the alternative of war. He was not without hope
that one or both of the belligerents would return to reason and repeal
the obnoxious acts, if the conduct of the United States, instead of
being aggressive, should be patient. Actuated by these views, the
president recommended to congress the passage of an embargo act. An
embargo law was enacted in December, 1807. By it all American vessels
abroad were called home, and those in the United States were prohibited
from leaving port. In consequence of this measure, the commerce of the
country was annihilated in an hour; and harbors, once flourishing and
prosperous, soon became only resorts for rotting ships. There can be no
question now that the embargo was a serious blunder. It crippled the
American resources for the war that ensued; made the eastern States
hostile to Jefferson's, as well as his successor's administration, and
tended to foster in the minds of the populace at large, an idea that we
shrank from a contest with Great Britain in consequence of
inherent weakness.

There was a fourth and last cause of exasperation, against England,
which assisted more than all the rest to produce the war of 1812. This
was the British claim to the right of impressment. In the terrible