purpose. How far the spectacular feature of a President crossing the
ocean to control in person the making of peace appealed to him I do not
know. It may have been the deciding factor. It may have had no effect at
all. How far the belief that a just peace could only be secured by the
exercise of his personal influence over the delegates I cannot say. How
far he doubted the ability of the men whom he proposed to name as
plenipotentiaries is wholly speculative. Whatever plausible reason may
be given, the true reason will probably never be known.

Not appreciating, at the time that Colonel House informed me of the
President's plan to be present at the Conference, that the matter had
gone as far as it had, and feeling very strongly that it would be a
grave mistake for the President to take part in person in the
negotiations, I felt it to be my duty, as his official adviser in
foreign affairs and as one desirous to have him adopt a wise course, to
state plainly to him my views. It was with hesitation that I did this
because the consequence of the non-attendance of the President would be
to make me the head of the American Peace Commission at Paris. There was
the danger that my motive in opposing the President's attending the
Conference would be misconstrued and that I might be suspected of acting
from self-interest rather than from a sense of loyalty to my chief.
When, however, the armistice went into effect and the time arrived for
completing the personnel of the American Commission, I determined that I
ought not to remain silent.

The day after the cessation of hostilities, that is, on November 12, I
made the following note:

"I had a conference this noon with the President at the White House
in relation to the Peace Conference. I told him frankly that I