necessary by the advocates of Caesar,--at least they defended it. The
gist of all the arguments in favor of the revolution is: better
imperialism than an oligarchy of corrupt nobles. It is not my province
to settle that question. It is my work only to describe events.

It is clear that Caesar resolved on seizing supreme power, in taking it
away from the nobles, on the ground probably that he could rule better
than they,--the plea of Napoleon, the plea of Cromwell, the plea of
all usurpers.

But this supreme power he could not exercise until he had conquered
Pompey and the Senate and all his enemies. It must need be that "he
should wade through slaughter to his throne." This alternative was
forced on him, and he accepted it. He accepted civil war in order to
reign. At best, he would do evil that good might come. He was doubtless
the strongest man in the world; and, according to Mr. Carlyle's theory,
the strongest ought to rule.

Much has been said about the rabble,--the democracy,--their turbulence,
corruption, and degradation, their unfitness to rule, and all that sort
of thing, which I regard as irrelevant, so far as the usurpation of
Caesar is concerned; since the struggle was not between them and the
nobles, but between a fortunate general and the aristocracy who
controlled the State. Caesar was not the representative of the people or
of their interests, as Tiberius Gracchus was, but the representative of
the Army. He had no more sympathy with the people than he had with the
nobles: he probably despised them both, as unfit to rule. He flattered
the people and bought them, but he did not love them. It was his
soldiers whom he loved, next to himself; although, as a wise and
enlightened statesman, he wished to promote the great interests of the