common herd, to be the first, distinguished among men, were thoughts,
that must have had their charms. Let us suppose then, that these
thoughts had worked so unusually on the passions of any particular
individual, as to have driven him to the extravagant design of obtaining
the preeminence by force. How could his design have been accomplished?
How could he forcibly have usurped the jurisdiction at a time, when, all
being equally free, there was not a single person, whose assistance he
could command? Add to this, that, in a state of universal liberty, force
had been repaid by force, and the attempt had been fatal to the usurper.

As _empire_ then could never have been gained at first by
_compulsion_, so it could only have been obtained by _consent_;
and as men were then going to make an important sacrifice,
for the sake of their _mutual_ happiness, so he alone could
have obtained it, (not whose _ambition_ had greatly distinguished
him from the rest) but in whose _wisdom, justice, prudence_,
and _virtue_, the whole community could confide.

To confirm this reasoning, we shall appeal, as before, to facts; and
shall consult therefore the history of those nations, which having just
left their former state of _independent society_, were the very
people that established _subordination_ and _government_.

The commentaries of Cæsar afford us the following accounts of the
ancient Gauls. When any of their kings, either by death, or deposition,
made a vacancy in the regal office, the whole nation was immediately
convened for the appointment of a successor. In these national
conventions were the regal offices conferred. Every individual had a
voice on the occasion, and every individual was free. The person upon
whom the general approbation appeared to fall, was immediately advanced