CHAP. IV.

Having now collected the materials that are necessary for the
prosecution of our design, we shall immediately enter upon the
discussion.

If any man had originally been endued with power, as with other
faculties, so that the rest of mankind had discovered in themselves an
_innate necessity_ of obeying this particular person; it is evident
that he and his descendants, from the superiority of their nature, would
have had a claim upon men for obedience, and a natural right to command:
but as the right to empire is _adventitious_; as all were
originally free; as nature made every man's body and mind _his
own_; it is evident that no just man can be consigned to
_slavery_, without his own _consent_.

Neither can men, by the same principles, be considered as lands, goods,
or houses, among _possessions_. It is necessary that all
_property_ should be inferiour to its _possessor_. But how
does the _slave_ differ from his _master_, but by _chance_?
For though the mark, with which the latter is pleased to
brand him, shews, at the first sight, the difference of their
_fortune_; what mark can be found in his _nature_, that can
warrant a distinction?

To this consideration we shall add the following, that if men can justly
become the property of each other, their children, like the offspring of
cattle, must inherit their _paternal_ lot. Now, as the actions of