lives of the vanquished, when they could have taken them by the laws of
war, to commute _blood_ for _service_. Hence the Roman lawyer,
Pomponius, deduces the etymology of _slave_ in the Roman language.
"They were called _servi_[044], says he, from the following
circumstance. It was usual with our commanders to take them prisoners,
and sell them: now this circumstance implies, that they must have been
previously _preserved_, and hence the name." Such then was the
_right of capture_. It was a right, which the circumstance of
_taking_ the vanquished, that is, of _preserving_ them alive,
gave the conquerors to their persons. By this right, as always including
the idea of a previous preservation from death, the vanquished were said
_to be slaves_[045]; and, "as all slaves," says Justinian, "are
themselves in the power of others, and of course can have nothing of
their own, so their effects followed the condition of their persons, and
became the property of the captors."

To examine this right, by which the vanquished were said to be slaves,
we shall use the words of a celebrated Roman author, and apply them to
the present case[046]. "If it is lawful," says he, "to deprive a man of
his life, it is certainly not inconsistent with nature to rob him;" to
rob him of his liberty. We admit the conclusion to be just, if the
supposition be the same: we allow, if men have a right to commit that,
which is considered as a greater crime, that they have a right, at the
same instant, to commit that, which is considered as a less. But what
shall we say to the _hypothesis_? We deny it to be true. The voice
of nature is against it. It is not lawful to kill, but on
_necessity_. Had there been a necessity, where had the wretched
captive survived to be broken with chains and servitude? The very act of
saving his life is an argument to prove, that no such necessity existed.
The _conclusion_ is therefore false. The captors had no right to