of his conquered opponent, when he was thought to be entitled to take
it, if he had chosen, by the laws of war.

To produce more instances, as an illustration of the subject, or to go
farther into the argument, would be to trespass upon the patience, as
well as understanding of the reader. In _a state of nature_, where
a man is supposed to commit an injury, and to be unconnected with the
rest of the world, the act is _private_, and the right, which the
injured acquires, can extend only to _himself:_ but in _a state
of society_, where any member or members of a particular community
give offence to those of another, and they are patronized by the state,
to which they belong, the case is altered; the act becomes immediately
_publick_, and the _publick_ alone are to experience the
consequences of their injustice. For as no particular member of the
community, if considered as an individual, is guilty, except the person,
by whom the injury was done, it would be contrary to reason and justice,
to apply the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_,
which belong to the people as a collective body, to any individual of
the community, who should happen to be taken. Now, as the principles of
_reparation_ and _punishment_ are thus inapplicable to the
prisoners, taken in a _publick_ war, and as the _right of
capture_, as we have shewn before, is insufficient to intitle the
victors to the _service_ of the vanquished, it is evident that
_slavery_ cannot justly exist at all, since there are no other
maxims, on which it can be founded, even in the most equitable wars.

But if these things are so; if slavery cannot be defended even in the
most _equitable_ wars, what arguments will not be found against
that servitude, which arises from those, that are _unjust?_ Which
arises from those African wars, that relate to the present subject? The