thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out
of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of
the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one;
which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves
to embrace truth wherever they find it.


2. General Assent the great Argument.

There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are
certain PRINCIPLES, both SPECULATIVE and PRACTICAL, (for they speak of
both), universally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they
argue, must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men
receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world
with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent
faculties.


3. Universal Consent proves nothing innate.

This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it,
that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths
wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can
be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in
the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.


4. "What is is," and "It is possible for the same Thing to be and not to
be," not universally assented to.