obedience to the loadstone, and would neither be drawn by it nor receive
direction from it, would any one question whether it wanted anything
essential? It would be absurd to ask, Whether a thing really existing
wanted anything essential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this
made an essential or specific difference or no, since WE have no other
measure of essential or specific but our abstract ideas? And to talk of
specific differences in NATURE, without reference to general ideas in
names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask any one, What is
sufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any two
particular beings, without any regard had to some abstract idea, which
is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species? All such
patterns and standards being quite laid aside, particular beings,
considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their
qualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be
essential to it; or, which is more, nothing at all. For, though it may
be reasonable to ask, Whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron?
yet I think it is very improper and insignificant to ask, whether it be
essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with; without
considering it under the name IRON, or as being of a certain species.
And if, as has been said, our abstract ideas, which have names annexed
to them, are the boundaries of species, nothing can be essential but
what is contained in those ideas.


6. Even the real essences of individual substances imply potential
sorts.

It is true, I have often mentioned a REAL ESSENCE, distinct in
substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their
nominal essence. By this real essence I mean, that real constitution