specifically different. But if any one will make minuter divisions, from
differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such
precise complex ideas give names that shall prevail; they will then be
new species, to them who have those ideas with names to them, and can by
those differences distinguish watches into these several sorts; and
then WATCH will be a generical name. But yet they would be no distinct
species to men ignorant of clock-work, and the inward contrivances of
watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the
marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all those other names
would be but synonymous terms for the same idea, and signify no more,
nor no other thing but a watch. Just thus I think it is in natural
things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say)
within, are different in a RATIONAL MAN and a CHANGELING; no more
than that there is a difference in the frame between a DRILL and a
CHANGELING. But whether one or both these differences be essential or
specifical, is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement
with the complex idea that the name man stands for: for by that alone
can it be determined whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man.


40. Species of Artificial Things less confused than Natural.

From what has been before said, we may see the reason why, in the
species of artificial things, there is generally less confusion and
uncertainty than in natural. Because an artificial thing being a
production of man, which the artificer designed, and therefore well
knows the idea of, the name of it is supposed to stand for no other
idea, nor to import any other essence, than what is certainly to be
known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or essence of
the several sorts of artificial things, consisting for the most part