made by nature, and distinguished by real essences.


50. Which Supposition is of no Use.

For, let us consider, when we affirm that 'all gold is fixed,' either
it means that fixedness is a part of the definition, i. e., part of the
nominal essence the word gold stands for; and so this affirmation, 'all
gold is fixed,' contains nothing but the signification of the term gold.
Or else it means, that fixedness, not being a part of the definition of
the gold, is a property of that substance itself: in which case it is
plain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance, having the
real essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of
substitution it has so confused and uncertain a signification,
that, though this proposition--'gold is fixed'--be in that sense an
affirmation of something real; yet it is a truth will always fail us in
its particular application, and so is of no real use or certainty. For
let it be ever so true, that all gold, i. e. all that has the real
essence of gold, is fixed, what serves this for, whilst we know not, in
this sense, WHAT IS OR IS NOT GOLD? For if we know not the real essence
of gold, it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that
essence, and so whether IT be true gold or no.


51. Conclusion.

To conclude: what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of
MIXED MODES by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have
all men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideas
of SUBSTANCES to things without him, as to archetypes made by nature,