most amiable and gentle of men. The brothers Howe would fain have
carried the olive-branch in one hand while they bore arms in the other.
It seemed to be the policy of England to do nothing which would inflame
animosities, and prevent the speedy restoration of peace. Spies of
course were hanged, and traitors were shot, in accordance with the
uniform rules of war. I do not read of a bloodthirsty English general in
the whole course of the war, like those Russian generals who overwhelmed
the Poles; nor did the English generals seem to be really in earnest, or
they would have been bolder in their operations, and would not have been
contented to be shut up for two years in New York when they were
not besieged.

At length Clinton saw he must do something to satisfy the government at
home, and the government felt that a severer policy should be introduced
into warlike operations. Clinton perceived that he could not penetrate
into New England, even if he could occupy the maritime cities. He could
not ascend the Hudson. He could not retain New Jersey. But the South was
open to his armies, and had not been seriously invaded.

As Washington personally was not engaged in the military operations at
the South, I can make only a passing allusion to them. It is not my
object to write a history of the war, but merely to sketch it so far as
Washington was directly concerned. The South was left, in the main, to
defend itself against the raids which the British generals made in its
defenceless territories, and these were destructive and cruel. But Gates
was sent to cope with Cornwallis and Tarleton. Washington himself could
not leave his position near New York, as he had to watch Clinton, defend
the Hudson, and make journeys to Philadelphia to urge Congress to more
vigorous measures. Congress, however, was helpless and the State
governments were inactive.