furnish him provisions. Howe could undoubtedly have held the New England
capital, but it was not a great strategic point. What was it to occupy
a city at the extreme end of the continent, when the British government
expected to hear that the whole country was overrun? At last Washington
felt strong enough to use his eight months' preparations for a sudden
blow. He seized the heights commanding the city and his intention became
evident. The active movements of the Americans towards an attack
precipitated Howe's half-formed plan for evacuating the city, and in a
single day he and his army sailed away, on March 17, 1776.

Washington made no effort to prevent the embarkation of the British
troops, since it freed New England, not again to be the theatre of
military operations during the war. It was something to deliver the most
populous part of the country from English domination and drive a
superior army out of Massachusetts. The wonder is that the disciplined
troops under the British generals, with guns and ammunition and ships,
should not have dispersed in a few weeks the foes they affected to
despise. But Washington had fought the long battle of patience and
sagacity until he was ready to strike. Then by one bold, sudden move he
held the enemy at his mercy. Howe was out-generalled, and the American
remained master of the field. Washington had accomplished his errand in
New England. He received the thanks of the Congress, and with his
little army proceeded to New York, where matters urgently demanded
attention.

To my mind the most encouraging part of the Revolutionary struggle,
until the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, was that period of eight
months when the British were cooped up in Boston, surrounded by the
Americans, who had plenty of provisions even if they were deficient in
military stores; when the Yankees were stimulated to enthusiasm by every