conquer a continent; hence Congress and the leaders of the rebellion
never lost hope. So long as there were men left in peaceable possession
of their farms from Maine to Georgia, and these men accustomed to
fire-arms and resolved on freedom, there was no real cause of despair.
The perplexing and discouraging things were that the men preferred the
safety and comfort of their homes to the dangers and hardships of the
camp, and that there was no money in the treasury to pay the troops, nor
credit on which to raise it. Hence desertions, raggedness, discontent,
suffering; but not despair,--even in the breast of Washington, who
realized the difficulties as none else did. Men would not enlist unless
they were paid and fed, clothed and properly armed. Had there been an
overwhelming danger they probably would have rallied, as the Dutch did
when they opened their dikes, or as the Greeks rallied in their late
Revolution, when fortress after fortress fell into the hands of the
Turks, and as the American militia did in successive localities
threatened by the British,--notably in New Hampshire, Vermont, and New
York, when they swarmed about Burgoyne and captured him at Saratoga. But
this was by no means the same as enlisting for a long period in a
general army.

I mention these things, not to discredit the bravery and patriotism of
the Revolutionary soldiers. They made noble sacrifices and they fought
gallantly, but they did not rise above local patriotism and sustain the
Continental cause. Yet at no time, even when Washington with his small
army was flying before Cornwallis across New Jersey, were there grounds
of despair. There were discouragements, difficulties, and vexations; and
these could be traced chiefly to the want of a strong central
government. The government was divided against itself, without money or
credit,--in short, a mere advisory board of civilians, half the time
opposed to the plans of the commander-in-chief. But when Washington had