hopelessness of a conflict which had lasted nearly two years, and in
which nothing more substantial had been gained by the English generals
than the occupation of New York and a few towns on the coast, while the
Americans had gained military experience and considerable prestige. The
whole civilized world pronounced Washington to be both a hero and
a patriot.

But the English government, with singular obstinacy, under the lash of
George III., resolved to make renewed efforts, to send to America all
the forces which could be raised, at a vast expense, and to plan a
campaign which should bring the rebels to obedience. The plan was to
send an army by way of Canada to take the fortresses on Lake Champlain,
and then to descend the Hudson, and co-operate with Howe in cutting off
New England from the rest of the country; in fact, dividing the land in
twain,--a plan seemingly feasible. It would be possible to conquer each
section, east and south of New York, in detail, with victorious and
overwhelming forces. This was the great danger that menaced the States
and caused the deepest solicitude.

So soon as the designs of the British government were known, it became
the aim and duty of the commander-in-chief to guard against them. The
military preparations of Congress were utterly inadequate for the
crisis, in spite of the constant and urgent expostulations of
Washington. There was, as yet, 110 regular army, and the militia
shamefully deserted. There was even a prejudice against a standing army,
and the militia of every State were jealous of the militia of other
States. Congress passed resolutions, and a large force was created on
paper. Popular enthusiasm was passing away in the absence of immediate
dangers; so that, despite the glorious success in New Jersey, the winter
of 1777 was passed gloomily, and in the spring new perils arose. But for