expressing opinions asked leading questions. He ceased to use words like
"certainly," "undoubtedly," or anything that gave the air of positiveness
to an opinion, and said "I apprehend," or "I conceive," a thing to be so
and so.

"This habit," he says, "has been of great advantage to me when I have had
occasion to inculcate my opinions and persuade men into measures that I
have been engaged from time to time in promoting. And as the chief ends of
conversation are to _inform_ or to be _informed_, to _please_ or to
_persuade_, I wish well-meaning and sensible men would not lessen their
power of doing good by a positive assuming manner, that seldom fails to
disgust, tends to create opposition and to defeat most of those purposes
for which speech was given us. In fact, if you wish to instruct others, a
positive dogmatical manner in advancing your sentiments may occasion
opposition and prevent a candid attention. If you desire instruction and
improvement from others, you should not at the same time express yourself
fixed in your present opinions. Modest and sensible men, who do not love
disputation, will leave you undisturbed in the possession of your errors."

It is really, I suppose, our old friend "compulsion" again. We hate
Prussianism in the realm of thought as much as in the realm of action. If I
tell you you've got to believe so-and-so, your disposition is to refuse to
do anything of the sort. It was the voluntary instinct that breathes in all
of us that made Falstaff refuse to give Prince Hal reasons: "I give thee
reasons? Though reasons were as plenty as blackberries I would not give
thee reasons _on compulsion_--I."

I was once talking to a member of Parliament, who was lamenting that he had
failed to win the ear of the House. He was puzzled by the failure. He was a
fluent speaker; he knew his subject with great thoroughness, and his