no troops could be spared until the Serbs were subdued. At the same
time orders were sent to Radetzki from Vienna to offer independence to
the Lombards, and constitutional nationality under the Austrian crown to
the Venetians: hence the Hungarian ministry for a time fancied that they
would not be fighting against the Italians, as they expected the terms
to be accepted by them. When it was farther represented that the
Italians had rejected them,--(for Radetzki, acting probably by secret
orders, suppressed the despatches, and never offered independence to
Lombardy, though the Austrian ministers made diplomatic capital of their
liberality,)--then the Hungarian ministry began to think the Italians
unreasonable; yet they did not go beyond their abstract principle, that
Hungary ought to grant troops for Austrian defence in Italy, provided,
1st, that rebellion in Hungary itself were repressed; 2d, that the
troops should not act against the Italians, unless the Italians had
rejected the offer of national liberties and a constitution coordinate
to those of Hungary, under the Austrian crown.

The protocol on this subject was drawn on July 5th; the public speech of
Kossuth concerning it was not until July 22d; and in this short interval
the treachery of the dynasty had been so displayed, that Kossuth could
no longer speak in the same tone as a few weeks earlier. For a fuller
development of this, I refer the reader to Appendix III. The real object
of the Austrian ministry, was, to ruin the popularity of Bathyanyi and
Kossuth, if they could induce them to sacrifice Italian freedom; or
else, to accuse them to all the European diplomatists as conspirators
against the integrity of the Austrian empire, if they refused to oppress
the liberties of Italy.

Finally, the reader has even here proof enough how false is the
statement which has been current in English newspapers, that Kossuth's