it encounters a rival power of natural growth. How was it possible
for the Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even
the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts?
How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist
for more than three-quarters of a century? Why did the Crusades
more and more become maritime expeditions? The answer to these
questions is to be found in the decline of the Mohammedan naval
defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of
the West. Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese transported crusading
forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the
Christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels. Even
the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration
of conditions. This is evident when we look at the efforts of
the Christians to regain the lost kingdom. Saladin 'forgot that
the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions,
and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx
from beyond the sea.'[28] Not only were the Crusaders helped by
the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received
reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the
'arrival of _Malik_Ankiltar_ (Richard Coeur de Lion) with twenty
shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.'

[Footnote 28: Ameer Ali, Syed, pp. 359, 360.]

Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the
importance of the naval states of Italy. That they had been able
to act effectively in the Levant may have been in some measure
due to the weakening of the Mohammedans by the disintegration
of the Seljukian power, the movements of the Moguls, and the
confusion consequent on the rise of the Ottomans. However that