south of the Gulf of Finland. Like the earlier monarchies of which
we have spoken, Russia, in the Baltic at least, now became a naval
state. A large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy
established. It was a purely artificial creation, and showed
the merits and defects of its character. At first, and when under
the eye of its creator, it was strong; when Peter was no more it
dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh.
It enabled Peter the Great to conquer the neighbouring portion
of Finland, to secure his coast territories, and to dominate
the Baltic. In this he was assisted by the exhaustion of Sweden
consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible,
the position of a _quasi_ great power which she had held since
the days of Gustavus Adolphus. Sweden had been further weakened,
especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with Denmark,
which prevented all hope of Scandinavian predominance in the
Baltic, the control of which sea has in our own days passed into
the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy--the
modern German empire.

The war of the Spanish Succession left Great Britain a Mediterranean
power, a position which, in spite of twice losing Minorca, she
still holds. In the war of the Austrian Succession, 'France was
forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and England
saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to
use it to the best advantage.'[42] This shows, as we shall find
that a later war showed more plainly, that even the Government
of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting
its naval affairs wisely. The Seven Years' war included some
brilliant displays of the efficacy of sea-power. It was this
which put the British in possession of Canada, decided which